I enjoyed Strange's strong opinion on whether or not the state has lost power. I can only really speak about the U.S., which I do agree has declined in power. I think a big point to bring up is our wishy-washy government. I’m not sure when this article was written, but it may have been before the 2010s. The U.S. has had a relatively stable, you-know-what-you're-getting, type of government. Even with the change-over of presidents. But ever since then, our reliability started to see-saw. One example would be with the Kurds - we were allied with them, then we betrayed them, then we begged to get back in their good graces, and then betrayed them for a final, disastrous time during the Trump presidency. They're a small-scale people, but they were valuable allies in the middle east. What message does that send to the allies who don't have the power of a G20 country or the advantages the Kurds brought?
Strange also argues that the “exceptionalism of the Asian state....has been substantially eroded, and will continue to be so,” (paragraph 5, right before “The Neglected Factor – Technology"). I disagree with the author here, and the NY times article I think supports this. China doesn’t have the military presence outside of its own country like the U.S. does, but their reach extends just as far if not farther. As Mauk puts it, China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” has large consequences for the countries in this position, like a backdoor readily built. And the strings attached here have less hoops to jump through than the three sisters, policy-wise. After all, money talks! If they didn’t have such abysmal social policies and weren’t committing an active genocide against the Uighur, they would be a much more attractive partner too. Rodrik's point about not neglecting the needs of the people and striking a balance between openness and domestic needs particularly applies to China here. If Strange is right about the diminishment of the Asian state, that’s where it can be seen in China. I think she’s right in a lot of ways for the U.S., but the concepts she talks about do not apply evenly. What it really comes down to is control. Who controls the technology, who controls the finance, and what power do they have to actually enact change.
2 comments:
I think China knows that militarily it does not have the presence as the US does but rather uses its economic presence as its power. You mentioned "debt-trap diplomacy" which is directly related to the BRI. When China invests in these poor countries it has a tendency to say that it is a loan of Chinese money and Labor and has to be paid back. When the loan is not paid back they simply seize the property and claim it as their own through collateral. I personally think this is China's way of becoming as powerful as the US and unfortunately it gets overlooked since the main focus of economics comes from the WTO, World Bank and the IMF.
I appreciated that you mentioned the Kurds in your post. This really was a disastrous situation that made America’s perceived power look weak. Keeping alliances and promises is an important part of international power that was just not used in this situation.
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